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PROCEDURE - THEORIES OF RECOVERY IN
THE PACKAGED FOOD CASES
Plaintiff, employed at Fort Monroe, requested a fellow employee to bring her an uncapped bottle of Coca-Cola from a vending
machine in a nearby building. After taking one drink, plaintiff
became ill due to a decomposed snail or slug in the liquid. Evidence
showed that defendant company delivered bottled drinks to a central
warehouse on the Post about twice a week. The vending machines
were filled from the stock in this warehouse by employees of the
Post Exchange. The jury awarded plaintiff $2,500 damages, the
trial court instructing that "they may infer negligence from the fact
that the foreign substance was found in the bottle, and the law
does not require the plaintiff to show the particular dereliction."
On appeal, held, reversed. The instruction deprived defendant of
the defense that the foreign substance may have gotten into the
bottle after it left defendant's hands. The inference of negligence
should have been predicated upon a finding that the bottle was not
tampered with after it left the custody of defendant and that the
obnoxious substance was in the bottle when defendant parted with
possession of it. Newport News Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Babb,
190 Va. 360, 57 S. E. 2d 41, (1950).
o One of the most prolific sources of appeal has been that line
of cases dealing with injuries sustained by consumers of food containing obnoxious foreign matter. After many years of litigation
the various jurisdictions remain in hopeless conflict, and the parties
in interest must remain unsure within their jurisdiction of the rules
upon which they may depend. In some cases the purchaser from
an independent retailer has been allowed to recover from the manufacturer of packaged goods on the theory of breach of an implied
warranty of wholesomeness., Many others hold that in such circumstances there can be no recovery since there is no privity of contact between the consumer and the manufacturer and thus no implied
warranty as to quality.2 Where this view prevails, it has not been
changed by the Uniform Sales Act.3 The majority view does not
allow recovery from the retailer on a warranty theory where packaged or bottled goods have been sold unless the retailer has expressly warranted them, since the purchaser is deemed not to have
relied on the skill or knowledge of his seller.4 Some courts, drawing a distinction between warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and an implied warranty of wholesomeness, allow recovery on
the latter theory.s In the jurisdictions refusing recovery on the
grounds of breach of implied warranty, resort must be had to the
theory of negligence. While the manufacturer of an article may

not be ordinarily liable for injuries resulting from its use to those
with whom it has had no contractual relations, there is a well recognized exception in the case of injuries suffered from eating food
preparations intended for human consumption, and a recovery in
tort will be allowed.6
Where the package or bottle has not been tampered
with before
coming into the hands of the injured party, some courts hold the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied,7 while others resist
its application.S Where it is applied, it is a substantial aid to a
plaintiff's case, since it is often held that the doctrine is not overcome by evidence that modern methods of packaging and inspection
have been utilized and a high degree of care exercised by the manufacturer.9
Evolution of the problem in Virginia has brought some final
answers from the Supreme Court of Appeals but several situations
remain without a definitive rule from that court. Since actioas
may be joined only where they are of the same nature, it has been
conclusively settled that causes of action in tort may not be joined
with causes of action in assumpsit. Even though each count may
be perfect in itself, if there is such a misjoinder, the declaration is
bad on general demurrer.io However, in one case it has been held
harmless error to overrule the demurrer and subsequently honor defendant's motion to strike the evidence relating to tort and not contract.'! If the plaintiff, forced at the outset to choose between
theories of negligence and warranty, chooses the latter, he finds
himself strictly confined. It is well settled in Virginia that any
implied warranty runs only to the immediate purchaser. The purchaser from a retailer cannot thus sue the manufacturer, nor can the
injured party sue either the retailer or the manufacturer where the
food in question was purchased by another not clearly shown to
be his agent at the time of purchase.1a Where the plaintiff sues
the retailer for breach of implied warranty, he has been allowed to
collect if the food was not bottled or packaged.14 The cases raise
the inference that there will be no contractual liability in the case
of bottled or packaged goods where the buyer has not relied on the
skill of the retailer,'s although strangely the court has never directly
nled on the issue.
The vast majority of Virginia cases are brought on the negligence theory. A dealer who sells unwholesome foodstuffs for immediate consumption is responsible in tort for negligence to anyone
whose injury could reasonably have been anticipated. This rule
allows suit against the manufacturer by the purchaser from a retailer, but it does not allow suit by an injured party who received
the food from a purchaser not his agent.' 6 It is in those cases

where a cause of action based on negligence exists that the law is
uncertain in what it shall require of the plaintiff and defendant on
the issues of proof and defense.
The plaintiff must bear the burden of proof of negligence by
a preponderance of the evidence.17 Since he is in no position to
know what has gone on in the packaging process, it is often argued
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied. A rebuttable
inference of negligence should be raised upon a showing that the
plaintiff bought the bottle or package, opened it and ate or drank
therefrom, and that as the consequence of some deleterious substance therein, was made sick. The court has held that where the
above facts are shown, a prima facia case has been made out by
the plaintiff which, if not overcome by evidence for the defendant,
is sufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff.,$ The prima
facia case is rebuttable by showing a high degree of care in the
bottling, preparation, -and inspection of the product, but such evidence is in conflict with a prima facia case and should go to the
jury.x9 Where the manufacturer has shown use of ultra-modern
methods of bottling procedure, the Supreme Court of Appeals has
nevertheless sustained a verdict for the plaintiff of the grounds that
the jury could have reasonably found that the foreign matter was
in the bottle at the time it left the plant.2o Therefore, in the light
of known propensity of the jury to hold for the individual as
against the bottling company, it would seem that allowing the
inference of negligence to arise through the application of the res
ipsa doctrine places the manufacturer in effect in the position of an
insurer. It is for that reason and because of the obvious opportunities for trumped up suits that the court has been progressively
reluctant to allow res ipsa loquitur to operate.
To sustain the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
it is usually said that an act must have occurred which does not
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. The act must have
involved an agent or instrumentality wholly within the control of
the defendant. It must not have been due to any contributory act
on the part of the plaintiff. It is often said' that the true facts
must be more accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. The
Virginia court, seizing upon the second and last of these elements,
has held that the doctrine is an evidential presumption sometimes resorted to in the absence of evidence, but that it is not to be applied
where evidence is at hand or where the event may have been attributable to causes for which defendant was not responsible.ar Thus
where plaintiff bought two Pepsi-Cola's at the grocer's, opened one
at home and drank from it leisurely for 15 minutes, only then
discovering a small mouse in the bottle, there could be no pre-

sumption of, negligence, since it was not shown that the mouse was
in the bottle at the time of purchase.za Likewise was the presumption inapplicable in the Babb case above, since the decomposed
snail might have gotten into the drink while it was capped in the
warehouse or while it was being carried uncapped for the distance
of 40 yards. It is evident that, as the court has said, "In Virginia,
the doctrine, if not entirely abolished, has been limited and restricted to a very material extent."23
In other related cases the presumption has been weighed more
heavily in favor of the plaintiff. It seems that ordinarily plaintiff
will be able to carry his case to the jury upon showing that he was
a passenger on a derailed train,24 that he was injured by fallen
wires,25 that there was an open door on a train through which he
somehow fell,26 or that he is the beneficiary of deceased under an
insurance policy where suicide is the defense.27 But in the case of
the injured Coca-Cola drinker, the court seems to demand more than
the plaintiff can ordinarily produce. Where, as in the Babb case,
plaintiff has shown the purchase, the direct course of the bottle to
him, and the injury resulting from foreign matter in the bottle, what
more can he prove? The court in the Babb decision finds this insufficient to raise the presumption of negligence and thereby infers
that a motion to strike plaintiff's evidence should be sustained.
On retrial of the Babb case, plaintiff will likely be able to do
no more than recite the same factual circumstances as before. The
trial court must then strike plaintiff's evidence or send it to the
jury minus an instruction raising a presumption of negligence. If a
judgment for the plaintiff is returned, the logical result would be
another appeal raised on the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the
verdict. By the Babb decision, it is submitted that the court has
forced two trials to do the work of one.
While it is generally true that where plaintiff has won the
right to deliberation of the jury in this type of case he stands an
excellent chance of winning his case, such a result is not too inequitable. It seems far more just to have such a risk borne by the
manufacturer as an expense of business than to have an honestly
injured consumer peremptorily precluded from recovery by rules of
evidence. This does not mean that in highly doubtful cases the
motion to strike should not be honored, or that verdicts contrary to
good reason cannot be set aside.
FENTON MARTIN
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